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Introduction 
 
The Government’s Intergenerational Report, tabled as one of a series of 2002 Federal 
Budget papers is the first in what may become a series of reports of this nature. Such a 
report is now required from time to time by the Government’s Charter of Budget 
Honesty Act 1998 .  The report (Table 13) highlights the concern that the future ageing 
of the Australian population may over-tax the workforce.  So-called ‘demographic 
spending’ on the part of the Commonwealth is predicted to rise from 13.9 percent of 
GDP in 2000 to 19.2 percent by 2041, a rise of just over five percentage points.  This 
prediction is derived from baseline projections of demographic and economic trends.  
The impact of alternative demographic and economic scenarios is summarised in 
Table 15 of the report, with a downside of an additional two-and-a-quarter percentage 
points and an upside of a reduction in demographic spending of just under one -and-a-
half percentage points, relative to the baseline scenario. 1  
The results of the report derive from the application of a complex model of future 
demography, future people-related federal outlays and future labour force trends, 
including labour productivity, labour force participation rates and unemployment.  
Clearly, over a 40-year period, there are substantial possibilities for variation in these 
trends.  In general, we conclude that the report is conservative in its assumptions 
about possible variations as only relatively small variations from recent trends are 
tested.  Future trends in all of the parameters of the model are based upon some form 
of extrapolation of past time trends.  This means that what is presented is a projection 
of what will happen if demographic, health and economic trends and government 
policies remain much the same as they have been in the past.  This approach is taken 
despite the  fact that the report itself calls for policy initiatives such as encouraging 
mature-age employment that would lead to changes in the assumed parameters.  It is 
our view that there is a range of possible policy initiatives that could significantly 
alter the assumptions of the model. These are discussed below. 
It is important also to realise that the outcome addressed by the report is the balance 
of Federal revenues and expenditure.  The report does not deal with State and 
Territory budgets or with household budgets.  However, given the cumulative impact 
of the productivity growth that is assumed in the report, output per worker doubles in 
the 40-year period and, accordingly, households would have considerably higher real 
                                              
1 These estimates come from summing across the “Total” rows in Table 15. 
incomes.  Also, as the costs of children are primarily private costs rather than public 
costs, households on average would have lower child -related costs as the ratio of 
children to workers falls.  If the sizeable real increase in household incomes leads to 
higher consumption expenditure, as is likely, then GST revenue would increase 
commensurately.  The report, therefore, draws a picture of ageing leading to severe 
pressure on the Federal budget while the living standards of Australian households, 
including households of aged persons, and State revenues increase substantially.  This 
distributional issue is a matter we think should have been addressed more explicitly in 
the report. 
While all of the major assumptions of the model are provided in the report, the 
workings of the model and numerous minor assumptions are not made explicit.  This 
means that we are only in a position to make broad comments on the outcomes.  We 
are not in a position to re-run the model with different assumptions.  The assessment 
method we use, a proportional approach, is described in the following section. 
 
The Components of Increased Fiscal Burden 
In order to assess the impact of the projections on the predicted fiscal burden, defined 
as the ratio of demographic spending to GDP, it is useful to decompose it as follows. 
 
 (1) 
Using acronyms for each variable, we can rewrite this relationship as: 
 
  FB  =  (DR  x  CPR)   /   (PR x [1-UR])    (2) 
 
The terms are defined as follows: 
DR is the dependency ratio: dependents relative to the population aged 15-64 years 
CPR is the  cost-productivity ratio: the ratio of the average fiscal cost per dependent 
relative to the average productivity of the employed.  
PR is the participation rate: the ratio of the labour force to the population 15-64 years. 
UR is the unemployment rate: the ratio of unemployed to the labour force. 
We can decompose the percentage change in the fiscal burden in terms of the 
percentage changes in the four components, as follows: 
 
 % change in FB   =  % change DR  +  % change CPR  -  % change PR   
       +  %-point change in UR (3) 
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 Note that in Formula (3), changes in the unemployment rate enter as percentage-point 
changes rather than percentage change in [1-UR].  This approximation is valid for 
relatively low rates of unemployment. 
The demographic component of predicted changes in the fiscal burden is the 
anticipated change in the dependency ratio.  The Report’s baseline demographic 
projection is given in Table 3.  It indicates that the aged dependency ratio is likely to 
double over the next forty years –  from its current level of twenty percent to forty 
percent in 2042.  The projected decline in numbers of children suggests that the total 
dependency ratio (populations 0-14 & 65+ / population 15-64) will increase by one 
third, from 48 per cent to 64 per cent. 
A one third rise in the dependency rate will, according to Formula (3), increase the 
fiscal burden by one third – if the other ratios do not change.  This projected 
demographic effect is clearly the driving force behind the Report’s baseline projection 
(Table 13) of a 38 per cent rise in the fiscal burden, from 13.9 per cent in 2000 to 19.2 
per cent of GDP. 
The Report gives estimates, under different scenarios, for the percentage point 
changes in the fiscal burden for 2042.  That is to say, a rise in the burden from 20 per 
cent of GDP to 22 per cent is represented not as a 10 per cent rise but as a rise of two 
points.  To facilitate comparisons, we can rewrite (3) in terms of percentage point 
changes in the fiscal burden, relative to the baseline prediction: 
 
   %-point change in predicted FB   =   [% change DR   +   % change CPR  
         -  % change PR  + change UR] x 0.192 (4) 
 
The number, 0.192, appears in this formula as the predicted fiscal burden under the 
report’s baseline scenario. 
Formula (4) enables a direct comparison of fiscal effects for changes in assumptions 
about the four components: demographic structure, the relationship between costs of 
dependents and productivity of workers, the labour force participation rate and the 
unemployment rate. The impact of each of these components is considered in the 
following sections. 
 
The Demographic Structure  
The report makes assumptions about future levels of fertility, mortality and annual net 
migration.  In the very long-term, past levels of fertility are the principal determinant 
of the age structure of the population.  The ageing of Australia’s population addressed 
in this report is the result of the replacement at old ages of the small cohorts born in 
the 1930s and 1940s by the large, baby-boom cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s.  
That is, the age structure of the population in 2042, the last projection year in the 
report, has a 100-year history to it.  We make this point to indicate that the effect of 
changes in fertility upon the age structure of the population is very long term in 
nature.  While variations in fertility from the level assumed in the report would have a 
large impact on age structure over the next 100 years, their effects in the next 40 years 
would be small. 
The report projects fertility to fall from its present level of 1.75 to 1.60 births per 
woman. An alternative fertility scenario is provided in the report where fertility falls 
further to 1.50 births per woman. In the present state of knowledge, either of these 
outcomes is possible. The fertility rate in Canada, a very similar country to Australia 
in regard to birth determinants, was already 1.52 in 1999. It remains possible that 
Australia’s fertility could fall below 1.5 births per woman or that the fertility rate 
could stay roughly where it is now.  This is an area where the mix of policies can 
affect the outcome.  However, over the next 40 years, whether fertility is 1.3 or 1.8 
births per woman makes little difference to the dependency ratio component of our 
formula.  The report projects a dependency ratio of 0.65 in 2042.  If fertility were to 
fall to 1.3 instead of to the report’s assumed 1.6, the dependency ratio would be 0.63. 
If fertility rose to 1.8, the dependency ratio in 2042 would be 0.66.  A fertility rate of 
1.3 births per woman reduces the dependency ratio by 2040 because there would be 
fewer children to support. Soon afterwards, however, the impacts of low fertility on 
the labour supply and on the ageing of the population would become severe.  This is 
an interesting example of  the importance of the time frame that is used in the analysis. 
A direction (lower fertility) that is favourable to the Federal budget up to 2042 would 
reverse to have a heavy negative impact for subsequent generations. Thus, the end 
point chosen for the projection makes a difference to the conclusions that are drawn. 
Restricting ourselves to the 2042 timeframe of the report, however, we consider that 
changes in fertility are not an important source of potential variation from the report’s 
findings. A caveat to this conclusion is that our formula does not distinguish between 
children and aged people in the dependency ratio. Compared to the report’s baseline 
scenario, a fertility rate of 1.3 would add about two percentage points to the aged 
dependency ratio by 2042 while reducing the child dependency ratio by about four 
percentage points. We are not in a position to consider the relative costs to the public 
purse of children and older people. 
The assumptions about future mortality that are made in the report differ somewhat 
from the assumptions made by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in its most recent 
projections of the Australian population. The essential difference is that the 
Intergenerational Report assumes that the expectation of life for women in 2042 will 
be about two years higher than the ABS has estimated. The level for men is much the 
same in the two projections.  If the report’s expectation of life for women was 
replaced with the lower estimate contained in the ABS projections, the dependency 
ratio in 2042 would fall from 0.65 to 0.62. Referring to our formula, a change of this 
size in the dependency ratio would lead to a fall of about 0.7 percentage points of 
GDP compared to the report’s baseline projection. This is a relatively sizeable impact 
which, taken together with the high degree of uncertainty about future mortality, 
underlines the degree of uncertainty attached to the report’s findings. The report 
models the impact of slightly higher expectations of life than those assumed in the 
baseline scenario. Again, the impact is significant but in the opposite direction – an 
addition to the fiscal burden.  Assuming constant costs for older people, improved 
survival of older people leads to increased Federal expenditure. To summarise, we 
would suggest that the report severely understates the potential variability of 
outcomes that could arise from varying levels of future mortality.  At the same time, 
we acknowledge that this potential variability could apply in either direction. 
Finally, the report as sumes a level of annual net migration of 90,000 persons.  In 
general, this is a reasonable assumption based on past trends, although the 
Government has recently announced a target for the next four years of around 
100,000.  Alternative scenarios of 80,00 per annum and 135,00 per annum are used in 
the report.  In the present state of knowledge, this range probably adequately spans the 
bounds of likely future migration levels.  Opposite to fertility, increased migration has 
its main impact in the shorter term but loses impact in the longer term (after 2042).  
The fiscal impact of an increase in annual net migration to 135,000, according to our 
calculations (consistent with the report) would be a fall of about 0.7 percentage points 
of GDP compared to the report’s baseline projection (migration of 90,000). 
 
Productivity Growth Projections  
 
The Report operates on a baseline assumption that labour productivity will grow over 
the next forty years at 1.75 per cent per year, close to its average rate over the past 
three decades.  A low growth scenario uses the productivity growth of the 1980s, 1.2 
per cent per year, whilst a high growth scenario assumes that the two per cent annual 
growth of the 1990s will continue.   
Small changes in annual rates of growth compound to substantial differences over 
forty years.  The three productivity growth assumptions imply that the ratio of output 
per worker in 2042 to current output per worker will be 1.61, 2.00 or 2.21 according 
to the low, baseline or high growth scenarios.  Taking the baseline demographic and 
productivity scenarios, it is predicted that the average member of the workforce in 
2042 will have to support one third more ‘dependents’ with double the amount of 
output.   
At first glance, this seems to pose little problem.  But this is only the case if the real 
costs of support for dependents are held constant, that is, if costs rise in line with the 
Consumer Price Index.  In practice, however, the costs of labour-intensive support 
services depend substantially on the costs of labour.  Real wages tend to rise in line 
with productivity, so there is a tendency for costs to also rise in line with productivity 
particularly if transfer payments are linked to average wage levels.  This assumption 
has clearly been factored into the projected fiscal effects of varying the projected rate 
of productivity growth because the high and low productivity growth scenarios are 
predicted to vary the fiscal burden by less than one quarter of a percentage point of 
GDP.   
If transfer payments and other demographic costs are coupled with wages, the fiscal 
burden is insensitive to productivity growth.  Aged and Disability Pensions are 
indexed to average weekly earnings.  Health, aged care and education services, being 
labour intensive, are also linked closely to earnings. Thus, there is a very direct and 
obvious relationship in regard to these costs.  Other social security transfer payments, 
especially those related to families, are linked more to changes in CPI than to changes 
in earnings.  This raise s the intriguing situation that, over 40 years, the increase in the 
living standards of aged pensioners would rise considerably while the living standards 
of families and those receiving benefits related to unemployment would not rise to 
nearly the same extent.  For example, according to the report’s baseline scenario, 
expenditure on Family Tax Benefit (Parts A and B) would fall from 1.6% of GDP to 
0.9%.  Furthermore, if the living standards of retired people on fixed incomes did not 
rise commensurate with earnings, there would be a growing incentive to organise 
one’s affairs in order to be in a position to take the public option of the Aged Pension.  
All of this is built into the Intergenerational Report’s model, but clearly policy 
changes would be required to correct the growing anomalies. 
According to the report, the largest single contribution to the increased fiscal burden 
derives from the increased costs of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).  Here, 
the main costs involved are the purchase prices from the drug companies, a cost not 
tied directly to changes in average earnings in Australia.  However, given the 
Intergenerational Report’s results, PBS costs must also increase in the model roughly 
in line with wages.  Reduction of the costs of the PBS is a central issue and is 
addressed later in the report. 
 
Rates of Participation in the Labour Force  
 
The Report’s baseline projections of labour force participation assume continuing 
increases in women’s participation – ‘limited over the longer term by child-raising 
and caring activities in which women traditionally play a large part.’ (Appendix B, 
p.71) – and continuing falls in men’s participation.  The higher participation scenario 
differs only for men aged 45 to 64, whose full-time participation is assumed to rise by 
five percent relative to the baseline scenario, as illustrated in Appendix Chart B2 of 
the report.  If this group constitutes approximately one quarter of the workforce, a five 
per cent rise in their participation increases total participation by 1.25 per cent.  We 
can use Formula (4) to deduce that the effect of this rise in participation would be to 
decrease the 2041 fiscal burden by around 0.24 points.2   
The baseline projections are illustrated in Chart B1 of the Report.  They show that 
participation rates for women aged 25 to 44 are predicted to grow much more slowly 
than they have done over the past twenty years.  This slowdown in growth is predicted 
to result in a 2041 participation rate around 77% for this age group of women,  
substantially lower than predicted rates for men, and substantially lower than the rate 
of participation for women that we observe now in France and Sweden.   
There are reasons that we might expect participation rates of women to grow faster 
than the rates assumed in the Report, in particular the rapid rise in female education 
that has occurred over the past three decades as documented in Table 1.  Higher levels 
of education of women increases both the opportunities and the rewards of 
employment, contributing to higher rates of participation in the workforce.   
Only one quarter of the cohort of women now aged around fifty stayed on to the final 
years of high school education.  Over the next few decades, they will be replaced in 
the working-age population by young women of whom nearly four-fifths have 
completed Year 12.  This huge increase in educational attainment of young women, 
achieved over just one generation, has already contributed to substantial increases in 
labour force participation.  It can be expected to continue.   
The trend to increased participation is likely to be further enhanced by the fact that 
25-34 year old females are participating in the workforce in higher proportions now 
than in recent decades.  A history of participation familiarises people w ith the world 
of work, increases their potential earnings, leading to higher participation of that 
cohort as it moves through its working-life.  For these reasons, we consider the 
                                              
2 This is derived as 0.192 x 1.25 = 0.24.  The actual figure given in Table 15 of the Report is –0.25 
percentage points. 
Report’s predictions on female participation to be unduly conservative.   
 
Table 1: Women’s Education and Labour Force Participation 
  
 
Year 12 Female 
Retention1 
Labour force 
participation ten 
years later 
1970 25%  54% 
1980 38%  65% 
1990 70%  70% 
1998 78%  ? 
1.  COLLINS, C., J. KENWAY, and J. MCLEOD (2000): Factors Influencing Educational Performance of Males             
and Females in School and Their Initial Destinations after Leaving School. Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, Ausinfo. 
2.  Female participation rate of 25-34 age group. 
 
There are also reasons to suspect that the projected labour force participation rates for 
males in the report are conservative.  We consider that there is considerable potential 
for the future reversal of the falls in labour force participation rates among men aged 
45-64 that have taken place since 1970.  Labour force participation rates of men in 
this age group may rise in future because of an increased demand for labour at these 
ages arising from possible future labour shortages.  If male age -specific labour force 
participation rates remained at their 1998 levels, there would be almost no further 
growth in the number of male workers aged less than 65 years after about 2015.  
Furthermore, those reaching ages 55-64 years in future will be better educated.  They 
will also be less likely to have worked in occupations or industries that have been 
declining because of restructuring.  Older workers will be better placed in a 
knowledge -based economy.  Future cohorts at these ages will also be less likely to 
have commenced work by age 15 and less likely to have worked in heavy manual 
labour.  They will also have had more experience of changing jobs during their 
working life and of on-the-job retraining.  Finally, because they will have had their 
children later in life and because children will be dependent upon parents for longer 
periods as they pursue education options, many men in their 50s will still have 
dependent children.  Thus, without any changes in policy, the chances of considerably 
increased labour force participation for men in the 45-64 age group is high.  The 
participation rate of Australian men in these ages is low by OECD standards, but the 
report only projects a marginal increase over the next 40 years.  With healthier ageing, 
employment beyond age 65 could also be a future prospect. 
Beyond these social changes, over such a long period of time, it is well within the 
bounds of policy potential that incentives for early retirement that pervade the system 
at present will be reversed and become incentives to remain in the labour force.  
National variations in levels of early retirement have been shown to be due primarily 
to differences in the incentive system.  Countries that provide strong incentives to 
retire early have early retirement. 
Variations in this parameter, labour force participation, have a double impact on the 
fiscal burden because an individual shifts from being a dependent to being a tax-
paying worker – expenditure falls and revenue increases.  As a high alternative, we 
consider what would happen to labour force participation if (i) the participation rates 
for men aged 35 and over rose over the next 30 years to what they were in Australia 
30 years ago and (ii) also over the next 30 years, participation rates for Australian 
women rose to the participation rates of Swedish women today.  Under these 
assumptions, by 2042, the labour force participation rate of 15-64 year olds would 
have risen to 82.8 per cent as compared to the report’s baseline projection of 75.2 per 
cent.  This represents a 10.1 per cent increase.  This would be equivalent to a 1.94 fall 
in percentage points of GDP in the fiscal burden, a very sizeable fall. This is without 
any allowance for increased participation at ages 65 years and over. In summary, we 
consider that the report is extremely conservative in regard to future levels of labour 
force participation.  We also consider that this analysis indicates the importance of 
policy initiatives that increase work incentives as opposed to early retirement 
incentives or disincentives for women to return to the labour force after having 
children. 
 
Unemployment Rates  
 
The Report’s baseline scenario assumes an unemployment rate of five per cent in 
2041.  Table 15 suggests that were the rate to be one point higher or lower, the fiscal 
burden would change by only 0.07 points.  This is much less than the impact of 0.19 
percentage points predicted by our Formula (4).   
The report’s discussion on page 63 mentions “higher GDP growth in the shorter term” 
and “lower Government spending, particularly on unemployment allowances.”  But 
their decomposition of the fiscal effects of lower unemployment (Table 15) only puts 
a figure in the category of “other payments to individuals”.  The impact of lower 
unemployment on the growth of real GDP is incorrectly stated as “neg” – probably 
because it has been copied from the panel above referring to the impact of higher 
unemployment.  Moreover, the impact of a change in unemployment on the fiscal 
burden should not be modelled through effects on output growth, but through its 
effects on the ratio of t he number of workers to the number of dependents –  as in our 
analysis.   
Our Formula (4) does not take account of the reduction in unemployment benefits that 
would result from a fall in the rate of unemployment.  Our prediction that a one point 
fall in the unemployment rate would reduce the fiscal burden by 0.19 points should be 
supplemented, to be consistent with the Report’s analysis, with their estimate of the 
impact on transfer payments.  That implies that a one point fall in the unemployment 
rate, relative to the baseline prediction for 2041, would reduce the fiscal burden by 
0.26 points.  A one point rise in unemployment would raise the fiscal burden by the 
same amount. 
 
Costs of dependents 
Table A1 of the report divides the projections of increased Commonwealth spending 
across the range of people -related Commonwealth programs.  Of the total increased 
fiscal burden of 5.3 percentage points of GDP by 2042 (baseline projection), fully 5.2 
percentage points derives from the health and aged care programs, a nd 2.8 percentage 
points from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme alone.  Thus, management of costs 
in health and aged care programs is a vital component of the reduction of the fiscal 
burden.  We do not have access to all of the relevant information in this area and so 
we are not in a position to make alternative estimates.  Only broad comments are 
possible.   
There are two aspects to PBS expenditure, usage rates and net costs to government 
per script.  On usage, the state of knowledge in Australia at present is low. This is 
indicated by the fact that the report is unable to apply age and sex specific costs of 
pharmaceutical usage in its calculations. This is a severe limitation given that usage is 
highly likely to be related to age and sex. Projection of future usage is also something 
of a lottery. There is a vast variety of trends and policies that can influence the end 
result. These include: 
· over-prescribing and policies to reduce it, especially in particular settings such 
as nursing homes and private hospitals 
· the use of cost effectiveness criteria in the listing of drugs in the PBS 
· some drugs will no longer be required if life styles change or cures are found 
(stomach ulcers, smoking) 
· some drugs will be used longer as people live longer and as prolonged use of 
the drug gains favour (anti-depressants, cholesterol lowering) 
· improved diagnostics could reduce the prescription of inappropriate drugs but 
increase the prescription of new drugs  
· the use of education programs, information networks and quality assurance 
processes in the prescription of drugs. 
Outcomes related to most of the trends listed above can potentially be influenced by 
public policy, and some are part of present policy, but the report makes no attempt to 
be specific in this regard. We conclude that there is a very high degree of uncertainty 
attached to the projection of future usage of drugs through the PBS. The report 
provides a misleading degree of certainty about this. 
In regard to the net costs to government per script, the two components are the 
purchase price paid to the manufacturer and the level of the payment made by the 
user.  Purchase prices have been increasing substantially over the past 15 years or so 
as new drugs come on to the market to replace old drugs that were negotiated at the 
much lower price that applied in the past.  It is this rise in expenditure that is factored 
into the report’s projections.  However, as the point is reached that all drugs in the 
PBS are part of the new, higher pricing arrangement, annual increase in expenditure 
would be expected to slow down.  This may be part of the explanation of the 
relatively smaller increases in recent years.  On the other hand (and in this area, there 
is always an ‘on the other hand’), as ever more ‘must use’ drugs appear, expenditure 
would tend to increase. 
The report implicitly presumes that the present pricing culture that exists between 
governments and drug companies will continue for the next 40 years. This is again an 
area characterised by immense unpredictability.  The level of payment made by the 
user is a matter for government policy.  The issue here is the extent to which the cost 
of drugs is absorbed by the user or by the society in general. There seems to be 
bipartisan agreement that some level of co-payment by the user is desirable for both 
cost and efficiency reasons.  The question is about the level of the co-payment. 
Unlike other areas of expenditure, the report does not produce the annual series of 
trends in the costs of the PBS.  Other information suggests that the annual fluctuations 
are very great indeed making any prediction of the future highly uncertain (Health 
Expenditure Bulletin, No. 17, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare).  
There may also be an argument that there is an interaction between pharmaceutical 
costs on one hand and medical and hospital costs on the other hand.  The argument 
put by the American economist, Tim Smeeding, is that with better diagnosis and 
better drug prescription, medical and hospital costs will fall.  The opposite interaction 
is sometimes suggested as well, that reduction in medical over -servicing will reduce 
over prescription of drugs.  The report makes no allowance for these interactions or, 
for that matter, for any other interactions between programs. 
The projections of the report are also affected by changes in the costs of diagnosis and 
of surgical procedures.  For example, there are questions about policy being brought 
to bear upon over-servicing in pathology and radiology and the impacts that this may 
have.  This is yet another area in which the past may not necessarily be a good 
predictor of the future.  Also, at a more general level, the promotion of healthier life 
styles will lead to healthier people and, especially, healthier older people.  While 
evidence is mixed, it does seem that people are living healthier longer, that is, age for 
age, people today are healthier than they were in the past.  This may lead to reduction 
in some health costs, particularly medical and hospital costs. 
All in all, there is a vast degree of uncertainty associated with the future costs of 
health and aged care programs.  This high degree of uncertainty is not given due 
respect in the report. 
The report’s costings of other programs, that is, government payments and education 
programs, are likely to be more reliable than those related to health because they are 
based on age and sex specific calculations and the cost components are better known 
and more predictable. 
 
Summary 
We would suggest that the report’s outcomes are weighted to the pessimistic side.  
The grounds for this suggestion are that the report: 
· understates the effect of a fall in unemployment 
· greatly underestimates the potential for future increases in labour force 
participation rates 
· presents an unduly certain picture of the levels of future costs of health and 
aged care. 
It is important to note that even if strong productivity growth does little to relieve the 
fiscal burden, which is the case if per capita costs rise in line with earnings, it does 
raise the living standards of the dependent population through the increased value of 
pensions and services to the aged. 
Furthermore, even if the Report’s baseline predictions are realised, and the tax burden 
does rise by five points, real after tax incomes are still predicted to grow strongly.  
Taking the baseline case where annual productivity growth averages 1.75 per cent, the 
combined effect of productivity growth and rising taxation will deliver real after -tax 
incomes in 2041 that are eighty-five percent higher than they are today.3  This does 
not compare particularly unfavourably with the one hundred per cent rise in after-tax 
income that would occur should the tax rate be held constant.  Should productivity 
growth maintain the two per cent annual growth rate of the 1990s, the rises in 
predicted real after-tax incomes are one hundred and five percent or one hundred and 
twenty percent, with or without the five point rise in taxation, respectively.  
 
                                              
3 These estimates are based on an estimate that total taxation currently accounts for twenty-seven 
percent of GDP.  
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